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15 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to the request of the Security Council in paragraph 3 of its resolution 933 (1994) of 30 June 1994.

2. It may be recalled that, in my reports dated 25 August 1993 (S/26352) and 21 September 1993 (S/26480), I recommended to the Security Council the establishment of a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to help implement the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993 (S/26063). On 23 September 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 867 (1993) by which it noted those reports and authorized the establishment and immediate dispatch of UNMIH for a period of six months. As authorized by the Security Council, the mission would comprise 567 United Nations police monitors and a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 700, including 60 military trainers. The objective was to provide, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Governors Island Agreement, guidance and training to all levels of the Haitian police and to monitor its operations as well as to modernize the Armed Forces of Haiti through non-combat training and participation in engineering and medical assistance projects. It should be noted that, at that time, the United Nations experienced difficulties in recruiting the required number of civilian police personnel.

3. As stated in my reports of 13 October 1993 (S/26573), 11 November 1993 (S/26724), 26 November 1993 (S/26802) and 19 January 1994 (S/1994/54) the mandate entrusted to UNMIH by resolution 867 (1993) could not be implemented because of various developments in Haiti which constituted non-compliance by the Armed Forces of Haiti with the relevant provisions of the Governors Island Agreement. I further noted that the reactivation of the mission would be contingent on a substantial change of attitude on the part of the Haitian military leaders towards the implementation of the Agreement.

4. In its resolution 917 of 6 May 1994, which imposed additional sanctions against Haiti, the Security Council decided that those sanctions would not be lifted until the creation of a proper environment for the deployment of UNMIH, the retirement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti and the resignation or departure from Haiti of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Haiti and the Chief of the Metropolitan Zone of Port-au-Prince.

5. In my report of 28 June 1994 (S/1994/765), I noted that the further deterioration of the situation in Haiti had substantially changed the circumstances under which the original UNMIH was planned. In the light of recommendations adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS) during their ad hoc meeting at Belem, Brazil, as well as the conclusions adopted by the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti on 3 June, I suggested that the Council might wish to consider modifying the original mandate established for UNMIH. It had become clear by then that 1,200 lightly armed military and civilian police personnel, could not by themselves ensure implementation of the mandate entrusted to UNMIH in the conditions which would be likely to exist immediately after the departure of the senior military leadership.

6. In its resolution 933 of 30 June 1994, the Security Council requested me to report as soon as possible, but not later than 15 July 1994, specific recommendations on the reconfiguration and strengthening of UNMIH including the strength, composition, cost and duration of the mission. In paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Council specified that my recommendations should include, inter alia, means by which UNMIH could, in due course, assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibility to provide security for the international presence, senior Haitian government officials and key installations, and in assisting Haitian authorities to assure public order and in the holding of legislative elections to be called by the legitimate constitutional authorities.

II. TASKS, STRENGTH AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OF AN EXPANDED FORCE

7. The tasks to be undertaken by an expanded force would be those originally entrusted to UNMIH by the Security Council in its resolution 867 (1993), together with the new tasks referred to in paragraph 3 of its resolution 933 (1994). The requirement for most of the latter tasks arises from the expectation that, after the departure of the senior Haitian military leadership and before the restoration in full of the legitimate Government's authority, there will be a period of indeterminate duration during which the legitimate authorities may require assistance in ensuring the security of the international presence and their own senior officials and key installations, and in ensuring public order more generally.

8. For many years, Haiti has endured a political and social climate characterized by widespread violations of human rights and other incidents of violence. That state of affairs has, as evidenced by the reports of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) which I have transmitted to the General Assembly, deteriorated sharply since the seizure of power by the senior leadership of the Armed Forces of Haiti in September 1991 and, especially, since their failure to respect their commitments under the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993. The deployment of the expanded force, and its provision of assistance to the legitimate authorities in the maintenance of public order, are likely, therefore, to take place in a disturbed and violent environment. Not only might the force face hostile actions directed against it by individuals or organized groups from the Armed Forces of Haiti or other

sectors of Haitian society that have supported the illegal regime, but it might also be confronted by intra-Haitian violence, as scores are settled after the departure of the senior military leadership. It would be required to help the legitimate authorities bring such violence under control, if the law and order resources available to them were not adequate to the task. It cannot therefore be excluded that the expanded force would have to use coercive means in order to fulfil its mandate. Given these law-and-order aspects of the expanded force's tasks, it would be necessary for the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the Charter in authorizing its mandate.

9. Against this background, the expanded force would need the capacity to ensure at the outset the establishment of a stable and secure environment throughout Haiti in order to facilitate the early restoration of the legitimate authorities and the re-establishment of their structures in working order, as well as implementation of the tasks previously assigned to UNMIH. It is therefore proposed that the mandate of the expanded force should include the following tasks:

(a) To control all main points of entry, seaports and the airport of Port-au-Prince, as well as main supply routes, so that the various elements of the international presence, including the force itself, could move freely in and out of the country and within it;

(b) To assist the legitimate authorities of Haiti in:

(i) The provision of security for the force's headquarters and other international facilities;

(ii) The provision of security for Haitian government officials and key installations;

(iii) Assuring public order, including the disarmament of paramilitary groups;

(c) To professionalize the Armed Forces of Haiti and to enhance their non-combat capabilities;

(d) To establish a new police force separate from the Armed Forces as envisaged in the Police Bill, which it is assumed would be ratified by the Haitian Parliament at the earliest opportunity;

(e) To assist the legitimate authorities in holding democratic elections for the renewal of the Parliament in accordance with the Constitution.

The assistance by the military component of UNMIH in the assurance of public order would be as described in paragraph 9 above and would not extend to other law and order duties, such as the arrest, detention and prosecution of individuals. The only exception would be the detention of individuals who attacked members of the force, but such detentions would be for only a brief period until the individuals concerned could be handed over to an appropriate Haitian authority.

10. In addition to the capacity required for the above-mentioned tasks, the force would need to be able to conduct operations in what could be hostile conditions. For this it would require:

(a) The capacity to react to unexpected eventualities;

(b) Sufficient logistic, engineering and medical support to be able to operate autonomously until it had succeeded in establishing a secure and stable environment.

11. It is estimated that in order to fulfil all the above-mentioned tasks in an uncertain and possibly hostile environment, the force would need to include the following elements:

(a) 5,000 combat troops made up of infantry units, helicopter units and special operations units;

(b) 6,500 combat support troops, including military police, intelligence, communications, engineer, medical, transport and logistic elements;

(c) An offshore reserve of 3,500 troops, including a marine amphibious unit and two infantry battalions;

(d) A group of about 60 military trainers;

(e) A civilian police component of about 550 personnel.

12. The proposed concept of operations envisages two phases:

(a) In phase one, the force would establish a secure and stable environment by providing assistance to the legitimate authorities as specified in paragraphs 9 (a) and (b) above. In this phase, all 5,000 combat troops would be deployed, together with as many units as required from the 6,500 support elements. The reserve forces would be utilized only if necessary;

(b) In phase two, the force would begin to implement those aspects of the Governors Island Agreement for which UNMIH was originally created, namely the modernization of the armed forces and the police as specified in paragraphs 9 (c) and (d) above. This phase would be initiated as soon as a secure and stable environment was established. Depending on conditions then existing and on progress made in professionalizing the Armed Forces of Haiti and forming the new police force, the troops deployed in phase one would progressively be reduced to the level required to maintain that environment. The reserve force would stay in place as long as considered necessary.

13. As regards the police component of the force, the main objective of cooperation in the police sector would be to assist in the establishment and organization of a Haitian police force separate from the armed forces. Pending its creation and training, police elements in the force would provide advice and assistance for the purposes of improving the functioning of the existing security forces and would monitor the latter's performance, ensuring that it conformed with human rights standards. Their functions would thus be strictly

limited to monitoring and training. It is hoped that their presence would have a favourable impact on the manner in which police work is carried out in Haiti.

14. To summarize the above-mentioned concept, an expanded force would need a maximum strength of just over 15,000 military personnel and about 550 civilian police personnel, with a mandate from the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, that would permit the force to use coercive means as necessary in assisting the legitimate authorities to carry out various public order functions. The expanded force would also require civilian personnel in various support functions. Additional international civilian personnel would be needed to assist the legitimate authorities in holding legislative elections, though this task might perhaps be better entrusted to a civilian operation rather than to an armed force.

III. OPTIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXPANDED FORCE

15. I have considered three options for the establishment of an expanded force along the lines mentioned above.

16. The first option would be for the Security Council to expand the existing force (UNMIH) and give it a revised mandate covering the additional tasks envisaged in resolution 933 (1994). UNMIH would continue to operate in accordance with the established principles and practices of United Nations military operations. Its expansion and the revision of its mandate would require the consent of the legitimate authorities. However, it would also be necessary, for the reasons explained in paragraph 8 above, that the Security Council's decision to revise the mandate should be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.

17. UNMIH would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. It would be headed by my Special Representative. Its military component would be headed by a Force Commander and the civilian police component by a Police Commissioner, both responsible directly to my Special Representative. Its military and police personnel would be contributed by Member States on a voluntary basis at the request of the Secretary-General in accordance with the conventions that have been established over the years. It would be financed collectively by the States Members of the United Nations under Article 17 of the Charter.

18. The first question to which this option gives rise is whether it would be possible to obtain the required personnel, with the necessary equipment, from enough Member States to conform with the established principle that no single Member State should contribute more than about one third of a force. Recent experience suggests that it is extremely unlikely that sufficient troops and police personnel would be available to permit deployment of the force on this basis in the urgent time scale required. In one recent peace-keeping operation, it took seven months to obtain and deploy the approximately 7,000 troops required; in another case, the Security Council approved the enlargement of an operation by 7,600 troops but over a year later only 5,300 have been obtained and deployed.

19. Even if enough troops could be found, their deployment with the necessary equipment would be likely to take three to six months. Preparation of a revised budget and its approval by the General Assembly would also take many weeks. It therefore seems impossible to envisage the expansion of UNMIH in a time scale which would permit its immediate deployment as soon as the senior military leadership leaves Haiti.

20. In these circumstances, I do not recommend that the Security Council decide to expand UNMIH to perform the additional tasks envisaged in resolution 933 (1994). For the reasons given above, it would not be possible to implement such a decision without offending certain well-tried principles of United Nations military operations which have been respected in other recent situations. Moreover, failure to implement the decision because of the difficulties mentioned above would damage the credibility of the United Nations. In these circumstances, I have felt it necessary to examine other options that would conform with the Charter, with past practice and with established principles.

21. The second option would be for the Security Council, at the request of the legitimate Government, to adopt a resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it would authorize a group of Member States to establish and deploy a force to carry out the tasks described in paragraph 9 above. The Member States could be either an ad hoc group formed for the purpose of creating a multinational force or the members of OAS, who could decide to set up an inter-American force. In either case, consultations would be required between the United Nations and the Member States concerned and the latter would need to indicate to the United Nations their readiness to undertake this responsibility if so authorized by the Security Council to do so. Under this option, the force would be under the command and control of the Member States contributing to it and those Member States would be responsible for financing it, with the help of such voluntary contributions as other Member States might wish to make available. This option has the advantage of not requiring any limit on the proportion of the force to be contributed by a single country.

22. The third option would be to entrust phases one and two of the operation (see para. 12 above) to different forces. Phase one would be undertaken by a multinational or inter-American force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, as envisaged in the second option, with the mandate of establishing a secure and stable environment. Phase two would, as originally decided by the Security Council, be entrusted to UNMIH, under Chapter VI of the Charter, with the strength authorized by the Council in resolution 867 (1993) for which budgetary provision already exists, for which Member States have already pledged the bulk of the military and police personnel required and which already enjoys the consent of the legitimate Haitian authorities. Advance elements of UNMIH would be deployed to Haiti as soon as possible after the deployment of the multinational or inter-American force and its main body would follow as soon as it was agreed that that force had succeeded in establishing a sufficiently secure and stable environment for work to begin on implementing the relevant provisions of the Governors Island Agreement. It would be essential that the multinational or inter-American force should not be withdrawn without an agreement having been concluded between the Member States concerned and the United Nations on the timing and modalities of its withdrawal.

23. If it were decided to choose the second or third option, the Security Council might wish to authorize the establishment of a small group of United Nations military and police observers who would coexist with the multinational or inter-American force (as the case might be) and whose tasks would be to verify the manner in which that force carried out the mandate conferred upon it by the Council and, as appropriate, to make their good offices available to facilitate achievement of the purposes approved by the Council.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

24. The situation in Haiti has deteriorated to an intolerable extent. The senior leadership of the Armed Forces of Haiti continue to defy the will of the international community and to inflict murder, rape and torture on the unfortunate people of Haiti who also bear the brunt of sanctions, notwithstanding the efforts of United Nations and other agencies to bring them humanitarian relief. In these distressing circumstances, I fully support the Security Council's wish, as expressed in resolution 933 (1994), to plan urgently for effective action to bring this situation to an end and restore the legitimate authorities.

25. As the present report makes clear, the mandate envisaged in resolution 933 (1994) is not an easy one and would require the deployment, for a period of unforeseeable duration, of a very large international force. Regrettably, the assembly, equipment and deployment of such a force by the United Nations in the time scale required (option one) is beyond the present capability of the Organization.

26. If, therefore, the Council confirms its decision in favour of a force with the mandate envisaged in resolution 933 (1994), it will have to seek the cooperation of another entity whose capacity and procedures would permit the timely formation and deployment of such a force. It is suggested in the present report that the Council might turn for this purpose either to a group of like-minded Member States or to OAS, who, if they so agreed, would be authorized by the Council to establish a multinational or inter-American force to help create a secure and stable environment and implement the relevant provisions of the Governors Island Agreement (option two).

27. Alternatively, the Council could decide to divide the work between a multinational or inter-American force and UNMIH (option three). As soon as the multinational or inter-American force had created what was agreed by the United Nations to be a secure and stable environment, the Security Council, taking advantage of existing decisions by itself, by the General Assembly and by the legitimate authorities, as well as existing pledges from troop-contributing countries, would deploy UNMIH to Haiti to carry out the mandate originally envisaged for it.

28. I should like to make one final observation. Extensive and essential though they are, the activities discussed in the present report would form only part of the support and assistance which Haiti will need from the international community as soon as the legitimate authorities are restored. As provided for in the Governors Island Agreement, a major effort will be necessary to provide

urgently needed humanitarian assistance, to facilitate the return and reintegration of refugees, to help the Haitian authorities to rehabilitate an economy damaged by sanctions and rebuild institutions and infrastructure, to promote respect for human rights and to foster the economic and social development which the Haitian people so richly deserve. If the proposals put forward in the present report are accepted, the Security Council will implicitly commit the international community to a long-term continuing programme of support to Haiti.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

Addendum

1. I wish to inform the Council that the estimated cost of establishing an advance team of not more than sixty personnel to carry out the functions described in paragraph 23 in my main report would amount to $934,000 for the first month including start-up costs of $187,000. The monthly cost thereafter would be approximately $747,000. This estimate provides for 40 military personnel, 20 international civilian staff and 10 local staff. The start-up requirements do not provide for transport, communication and other equipment which are already available in Haiti.

2. The cost for an increase in the troop level of UNMIH to 6,000 and for 567 civilian police personnel, and approximately 350 international civilian staff and 500 local staff for a six-month period is estimated at $215 million. This amount does not include requirements for electoral activities.

3. A breakdown of the estimated costs indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 above is provided by main categories of expenditure, for information purposes, in the annexes to the present addendum.

4. Should the Security Council decide on the establishment of the advance team and increases the troop level, it would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the UNMIH special account.

Annex I

Cost estimate for the deployment of an advance team of 60 personnel

(In thousands of United States dollars)

		Start-up cost	Monthly cost
1.	Military personnel costs	102	172
2.	Civilian personnel costs	40	322
3.	Premises/accommodation	-	15
4.	Infrastructure repairs	-	-
5.	Transport operations	-	11
6.	Air operations	-	60
7.	Naval operation	-	-
8.	Communications	-	10
9.	Other equipment	-	-
10.	Supplies and services	15	86
11.	Election-related supplies and services	-	-
12.	Public information programmes	15	-
13.	Training programmes	-	-
14.	Mine-clearing programmes	-	-
15.	Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-	-
16.	Air and surface freight	15	-
17.	Integrated Management Information System	-	-
18.	Support account for peace-keeping operations	-	31
19.	Staff assessment	-	40
	Total, lines 1-19	187	747

Annex II

Cost estimate for the deployment of 6,000 troops for a six-month period

(In thousands of United States dollars)

		Amount
1.	Military personnel costs	78 505
2.	Civilian personnel costs	27 335
3.	Premises/accommodation	13 120
4.	Infrastructure repairs	9 500
5.	Transport operations	18 639
6.	Air operations	12 733
7.	Naval operation	-
8.	Communications	3 770
9.	Other equipment	7 716
10.	Supplies and services	28 918
11.	Election-related supplies and services	-
12.	Public information programmes	200
13.	Training programmes	2 400
14.	Mine-clearing programmes	-
15.	Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-
16.	Air and surface freight	8 200
17.	Integrated Management Information System	-
18.	Support account for peace-keeping operations	1 476
19.	Staff assessment	2 468
	Total, lines 1-19	215 000

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Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 31
THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 12 July 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the situation in Haiti, which has deteriorated further in the past few days.

By its resolution 48/27 B of 8 July 1994, the General Assembly approved the extension of the mandate of the International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) for one year. This joint United Nations/Organization of American States (OAS) human rights monitoring mission has been performing the useful role of verifying compliance with international human rights standards in Haiti in order to assist in the establishment of a climate of freedom and tolerance propitious to the restoration of democracy in that country.

On 11 July 1994, the de facto authorities in Haiti delivered to the Executive Director of MICIVIH in Port au Prince a decree of the "Provisional President" declaring the international staff of MICIVIH "undesirable" and giving them 48 hours to leave Haitian territory.

Taking into consideration the security of the staff of MICIVIH, I decided, in consultation with the Acting Secretary-General of OAS, that they would have to be evacuated. It is planned that both the United Nations and the OAS personnel will leave Haiti tomorrow (13 July).

I deplore the fact that, despite the efforts of the international community, the de facto authorities in Haiti, who continue to flout their commitments under the Governors Island Agreement, have now stopped the monitoring of the violations of human rights and political freedoms which are taking place in the country.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

94-29481 (E) 190794 19/07/94

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LETTER DATED 14 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following instances of violations by Iraq of the terms of the cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 1 April 1994, at 2230 hours, a number of Iraqi boats crossed the border line at the intersection of Arvandrood the Karoon River at the geographic coordinates of TP2770 on the map of Khorramshahr. They intended to approach Iranian forces, and then fired at the border police for 10 minutes and left the area at 2240 hours.

2. On 3 April 1994, at 0200 hours, 10 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory, north of Champarav and Shakh-Ashkoot Mount, 14 kilometres north of border pillars 100 and 101. They entered the Armordeh village at the geographic coordinates of NE7176 on the map of Baneh and kidnapped two villagers, whom they took with them towards Iraq.

3. On 4 April 1994, at 0250 hours, a number of anti-revolutionary elements fired three RPG-7 bullets in the direction of the Godarkhosh Bridge at the geographic coordinates of NC9412 on the map of Sarney, north of Koomak Mount and border pillar 34/8 and the Tarikeh Strait. The bullets hit the riverside.

4. On 5 April 1994, at 2045 hours, five Iraqi motor boats were seen patrolling at the geographic coordinates of TP5330 on the map of Khosroabad.

5. On 7 April 1994, at 0230 hours, six anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographic coordinates of NC5747 of Northern Sumar of Ney Bian and Gozin. These elements were pursued by Iranian forces and returned to Iraq.

6. On 8 April 1994, at 2200 hours, anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at Raggeh Darpojh Village at the geographic coordinates of PE0048 on the map of Marivan. They threatened the residents of the village and then return to Iraq at night.

7. On 9 April 1994, at 1255 hours, nine Iraqi military personnel entered no man's land at the geographic coordinates of QA7021 on the map of Chazzabeh, south of border pillar 16 and north of border pillar 15. They proceeded to destroy the trenches at this location.

8. On 11 April 1994, at 0930 hours, three Iraqi military personnel at Meimak Heights, in the vicinity of Shohada Hill, were seen digging trenches at the geographic coordinates of NC822192 on the map of Halaleh, north-west of border pillar 35/8.

9. On 11 April 1994, at 0930 hours, three Iraqi military personnel at the geographic coordinates of 832-192 on the map of Halaleh in no man's land, were seen constructing embankments.

10. On 12 April 1994, at 0130 hours, three Iraqi military personnel at the geographic coordinates of 40200-51100 on the map of Khosroabad, armed with uzi weapons and at a distance of 100 metres from the border opposite Khosroabad sentry post, fired at the Iranian forces whose reaction forced Iraqis escaped towards Iraqi territory.

11. On 13 April 1994, at 1130 hours, three anti-revolutionary elements disguised in border patrol uniforms, fired at Iranian forces within 3 kilometres south-east of border pillar 112 at the geographic coordinates of NF30250-13000 and NF307514250 of Alavan, south-west of Mazra'eh and east of border pillar 112. The Iranian forces reacted and forced those elements to return to Iraqi territory.

12. On 13 April 1994, at 1600 hours, Iraqi military personnel proceeded to set fire to the dry grass in front of Reza-Abad sentry post at the geographic coordinates of PB77100110 on the map of Mehran in no man's land, south of Zalooab and border pillar 23/3. The fire caused four land mines which were planted during the war to explode and their sharpnel hit Iranian territory.

13. On 13 April 1994, at 2400 hours, a number of Iraqi forces stationed at the geographic coordinates of ND410091 on the map of Khosravi, north-west of border pillar 54 and south of border pillars 55, 55/1, and 55/2, fired shots for 15 minutes using light weapons and mortar guns. The shells from the shots hit locations within Iranian territory.

14. On 14 April 1994, Iraqi military personnel in groups of two and four entered no man's land at the geographic coordinates of QA328736 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar, west of border pillar 22/22 and at the coordinates of QA0693 on the map of Meimak River south of border pillar 23 and the coordinates of QA7021 of Chazzabeh, south of border pillar 16 and north-west of border pillar 15.

15. On 14 April 1994, at 1110 hours, four Iraqi military personnel in a patrol vehicle left the Siloo Road in the vicinity of Khosravi, at the geographic coordinates of ND374069 on the map of Khosravi and entered no man's land, south-west of border pillars 55/2, 55/1, and 55. They stopped at the geographic coordinates of ND415102 of Khosravi and then left the area at 1200 hours.

16. On 16 April 1994, at 1040 hours, four anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory. They intended to penetrate the Khoveisseh Base at the geographic coordinates of PA951995 on the map of Koohe Gotbeh, north of border pillar 24/9. They were forced to return into Iraqi territory by Iranian forces. Those elements left two RPG-7 rockets behind.

17. On 17 April 1994, at 1040 hours, four Iraqi military personnel dressed in commando uniforms, armed with individual weapons and carrying binoculars, were seen scouting opposite the geographic coordinates of TP369591 on the map of Abadan.

18. On 18 April 1994, at 1400 hours, a Mercedes Benz carrying personnel, one of whom was a woman, dressed in commando uniforms were seen scouting at Koohe Gotbeh.

19. On 23 April 1994, 13 Iraqi motor boats were seen patrolling Arvandrood at the geographic coordinates of TP3650059500 of Abadan and the geographic coordinates of TP480468 of Khosroabad.

20. On 24 April 1994, at 1900 hours, 10 Iraqi military personnel were seen passing through the geographic coordinates of NC548416 of Sumar in no man's land, west of border pillar 43.

21. On 24 April 1994, nine anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory 36 kilometres east of border pillar 83/6. They entered the village of Darri at the geographic coordinates of PE2124 of Sarvabad and then left the village to return to Iraq.

22. On 26 April 1994, at 2100 hours, six anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory six kilometres east of border pillar 83/6, north of Sooren Heights at the geographic coordinates of NE9625 of Ney. They entered the village Oskool and then left the village to return to Iraq.

23. On 26 April 1994, at 2200 hours, seven anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory 22 kilometres east of border pillar 83/6. They were seen at Balik village at the geographic coordinates of PE1226 and then left the village to return to Iraq.

24. On 27 April 1994, at 0830 hours, five Iraqi military personnel were seen collecting barbed wire at the geographic coordinates of ND635249 of Ghasr-e-Shirin in no man's land, west of Majid Ghadir Agha in Iraq.

25. On 27 April 1994, at 0830 hours, five Iraqi military personnel were seen collecting barbed wire in no man's land, at the geographic coordinates of ND462158 of Kharrateha.

26. On 27 April 1994, at 1100 hours, an Iraqi military personnel was seen surveying at the geographic coordinates to TP3956 of Abadan.

27. On 27 April 1994, at 1300 hours, two Iraqi loaders and trucks were seen operating at the geographic coordinates of PB333444 of Koohe Toonel in no man's land, south of border pillars 26/5 and 26/6.

28. On 27 April 1994, at 1720 hours, five anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered the Iranian village of Kavizeh Kooreh at the geographic coordinates of PE1430 of Chenareh, 24 kilometres south-east of border pillar 86. They then left the village to return to Iraq.

29. On 27 April 1994, 21 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory, north of Shakh Ashkoot Mount and Soorkooh, 8 kilometres north of border pillar 101 and Champarava at the geographic coordinates of NE6971 of Baneh. They were pursued by Iranian forces and then returned to Iraqi territory.

30. On 27 April 1994, 14 Iraqi vehicles were seen passing through the geographic coordinates of QA0793 of Meimah River in no man's land, south of border pillar 22/50 and the geographic coordinates of PB333444 of Koohe Toonel in no man's land, south of border pillars 26/5 and 26/6 and the coordinates of PZ9240099500 of Koohe Gotbeh in no man's land, south of border pillar 24/12 and the geographic coordinates of QA348736 of Nahr-e-Anbar in no man's land, south-west of border pillar 22/22.

31. On 27 April 1994, seven Iraqi motor boats were seen patrolling in Arvandrood at the geographic coordinates of TP4835 and TP5422 of Khosroabad and at TP4155 and TP4056 of Abadan.

32. On 27 April 1994, nine anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border behind Darri village at the geographic coordinates of PE2124 of Sarvabad and entered Iranian territory 33 kilometres east of border pillar 83/6. They then left the village and returned to Iraq.

33. On 29 April 1994, at 2215 hours, two Iraqi motor boats crossed the border line with the intention of approaching the Iranian base at the geographic coordinates of TP241719 of Khorramshahr. They were forced to retreat when confronted with the Iranian forces.

34. On 30 April 1994, at 1400 hours, a number of Iraqi officers in a patrol car entered the Manzarieh sentry post at the geographic coordinates of ND4204 of Khosravi. They left the area through no man's land, west of border pillar 53/2.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/831
17 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 7 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NEW ZEALAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 917 (1994) concerning Haiti.

The Permanent Representative is pleased to notify the Secretary-General of the adoption by the Government of New Zealand of the United Nations Sanctions (Haiti) Regulations 1994 on 7 June 1994 and attaches a copy for his reference.*

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* The text of the Regulations may be consulted in room S-3545.

94-29121 (E) 180794 18/07/94

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/832
15 July 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Acting on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following. The presence of the "President" of the "Interim Government" of Rwanda and four of his "Ministers" has been observed in Cyangugu in the safe humanitarian area in south-west Rwanda. The French authorities have given official notice that they will not tolerate any political or military activity in this safe area, which is strictly humanitarian in nature, and that they will take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules applicable to the area.

The French authorities are ready to lend their support to any Security Council decision relating to the persons in question. The French authorities are at the disposal of the United Nations to consider any decision in respect of which the Organization might wish France to lend its support.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hervé LADSOUS

94-28884 (E) 150794 150794

UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/48/969
S/1994/833
15 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 15 July 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the attached letter of today's date from my President, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, addressed to you.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan Z. MISIĆ
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 15 July 1994 from the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General

I regret to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been extremely displeased by the knowledge that the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) was unable to facilitate the transportation of Mr. Suleyman Demirel, President of Turkey, to Sarajevo, and in this way has prevented his previously announced official visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is a well-known fact that since the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey has played a very constructive role, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in the wider Balkan region.

Recently, Turkey contributed soldiers to the peace-keeping operations of UNPROFOR. Therefore, it is difficult to comprehend the above-mentioned decision of the United Nations Administration.

It is with great regret that we have to take note of the double standards being applied by the top-ranking officials of the United Nations, with respect to, and rarely for, the benefit of distinguished personalities from a particular cultural-civilizational milieu.

If the grounds for the refusal to facilitate the visit of President Demirel to Sarajevo was a threat from Karadzic's Serbs, then acceptance of such threats would inevitably lead to the de facto recognition and legalization of terrorism in international practice.

We deem such decisions of the executive organs of the United Nations to be inconsistent with the spirit and fundamental beliefs of the Charter of the United Nations.

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ
President

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/834
18 July 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The French Government has asked me to inform you urgently of the deterioration of the situation in Rwanda and in the area near Goma, where the humanitarian aid operation for the Rwandese refugee population is based.

As you are aware, artillery bombardments coming from the east and, therefore, from Rwanda and probably conducted by forces of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), were directed today at the village of Goma. These bombardments have already left some 60 civilians dead and many wounded, particularly in the airport zone. The humanitarian lifeline from the Goma airport established by the United Nations with the assistance of French forces had to be immediately suspended. The refugee population, whose situation was already tragic, is even more directly threatened today.

The French Government condemns these bombardments, which are directed at the refugee population and are impeding humanitarian operations established by the international community in response to a tragedy of immense proportions. It calls once again for the immediate implementation of the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council.

I must also inform you that armed RPF elements attempted this afternoon to enter the humanitarian safe area established in south-west Rwanda. An encounter ensued with the French forces responsible for ensuring that the humanitarian character of this area is respected.

The French Government will of course ensure that this character is respected and French forces will, as announced from the outset, continue to oppose the entry of all armed persons, no matter what their origin, into the humanitarian safe area, where all military activity is by nature prohibited.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the Security Council by transmitting this letter to it as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Hervé LADSOUS
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

94-29176 (E) 180794 180794

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/835
18 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1994 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached joint communiqué signed on 12 July 1994 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Kresimir Zubak, and the Vice-President of the Federation, Mr. Ejup Ganić.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

Signed) Ivan Z. MISIĆ
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

Annex

Joint communiqué signed on 12 July 1994 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and the President and the Vice-President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the signatories of the Geneva Agreement of 8 June 1994 have confirmed its extension for a further period of one month beyond 10 July 1994. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) reiterates its commitment and its best endeavours to achieve the aims stipulated in the above Agreement.

UNPROFOR reaffirms that within its mandates and resources, it will attempt to eradicate ethnic cleansing and other violations of human rights, in cooperation with other United Nations and relevant international organizations, and will continue to inform the international community of the situation. To attain this purpose the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will continue to press for an UNPROFOR presence in the Banja Luka area, as well as for his personal visit.

Taking note of the contributions made by the International Committee of the Red Cross on some aspects of the 8 June Agreement, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General welcomes the assurances given to him to continue to work towards early positive results in the implementation of paragraph 2 of that Agreement, with an attitude of greater flexibility.

In addition to its commitment to monitor and report all military activities as stipulated under the 8 June 1994 Agreement, UNPROFOR will endeavour to enhance its ability to monitor relevant military movements throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the air and on the ground.

UNPROFOR strongly reaffirms its right to complete and unhindered freedom of movement, as well as that of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its implementing partners. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General is committed to exercising this right with all vigour. In this connection, he is determined soon to resume UNPROFOR flights to Tuzla and to arrive at acceptable modalities for humanitarian flights. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also expects the parties to guarantee the safety and security of UNPROFOR and other United Nations personnel in all circumstances.

(Signed) Yasushi AKASHI

(Signed) Kresimir ZUBAK

(Signed) Ejup GANIĆ

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/836
18 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 14 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BAHAMAS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and with reference to Note SCA/13/94 (1) of 10 May 1994, has the honour to inform him that in 1991, in response to the economic sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States against Haiti, the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas issued an order freezing all assets of the Haitian State in the Bahamas. This order remains in force. Further, the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas issued two additional orders* (The International Obligation (Economic and Ancillary Measures) Haiti Order 1994), dated 6 May 1994, and 7 July 1994, respectively, prohibiting trade and other economic relations with Haiti. By these measures, the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas has implemented Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994.

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* The text of the two orders may be consulted in room S-3545.

94-29258 (E) 180794

180794

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/837
18 July 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 13 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BOLIVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to the provisions of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994 on Haiti, particularly those contained in paragraphs 13 and 14, has the honour to state that the Government of Bolivia has, through its competent agencies, taken all necessary measures for the timely and appropriate implementation of the provisions agreed upon in the resolution in question.

94-29264 (E) 180794 180794

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/838
18 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to your report of 12 July 1994 on the situation in Yemen (S/1994/817). The members of the Council welcome this report and are grateful to you and your Special Envoy for your efforts pursuant to Security Council resolutions 924 (1994) of 1 June 1994 and 931 (1994) of 29 June 1994.

The members of the Council agree that the cessation of fighting in the Republic of Yemen, in itself, will not bring a lasting solution to the crisis in that country and that it is essential to start a process of political dialogue between the parties.

The members of the Council expect the Government of the Republic of Yemen to fulfil the commitments and decisions contained in the letter from the Acting Prime Minister referred to in paragraph 15 of your report, in accordance with resolutions 924 (1994) and 931 (1994), which have been accepted by the Government of the Republic of Yemen, and international humanitarian law. Refugees and displaced persons must be allowed to return in safety to their homes.

The members of the Council are concerned at reports of continuing looting in Aden. They agree that firm action is urgently needed to put an end to such acts. They also remain concerned at the humanitarian situation in the Republic of Yemen and look forward to the United Nations inter-agency assessment of the humanitarian needs of the country.

The members of the Council welcome your readiness to continue to use your good offices, including through your Special Envoy, to bring about reconciliation in Yemen and to extend all possible help and cooperation, and urge the parties to cooperate fully with you to this end.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council

94-29277 (E) 180794 18/07/94

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/839
18 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 923 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report, which covers developments relating to the political reconciliation process, the humanitarian mission, the security situation and institution-building in Somalia, is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of paragraph 2 of resolution 923 of 31 May 1994.

2. My new Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. James Victor Gbeho of Ghana, arrived in Somalia on 1 July 1994. The outgoing Acting Special Representative, Mr. Lansana Kouyate, will stay on in Somalia until the end of July 1994 in order to ensure a smooth hand-over of responsibilities.

II. THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION

3. Progress continues to be made towards the objectives of overcoming the emergency requirement and moving into the recovery phase by improving the situation of the most vulnerable, particularly women and children, and finding lasting solutions to the plight of the refugees and the internally displaced persons. But these gains on the humanitarian front remain extremely fragile in the face of continuing insecurity and in the absence of a structured indigenous capacity to deal effectively with the welfare of the vulnerable segments of the population and to cope with natural or man-made disasters.

4. The Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) has continued to provide services of coordination, information and logistical support to the humanitarian community, while pursuing its efforts to assist in the resettlement of the internally displaced persons and promoting the implementation of small-scale community projects in priority geographical areas and sectors where operational agencies are absent.

5. The period under review was marked by the containment of a potentially catastrophic cholera outbreak and the continuation of the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons. There were, at the same time, several important setbacks, which included the interruption, for security reasons, of the activities of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Kismayo as well as those of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Afmadu and Buale and the Save the Children Fund (UK) in Mogadishu.

A. Sectoral review

Food and nutrition

6. During most of 1993, WFP provided large-scale emergency relief assistance to approximately 1.2 million people. By the end of 1993, the situation had improved with the number of beneficiaries dropping to 650,000. WFP proceeded to shift its focus from relief to rehabilitation. By March 1994, WFP was supporting 550 small-scale rehabilitation schemes. These schemes are generating employment, revitalizing the agricultural sector, reactivating a market economy and promoting food self-sufficiency. Whereas in January 1993 emergency work accounted for 100 per cent of WFP assistance in Somalia, by May 1994 it stood at about 25 per cent, with some 130,000 people receiving emergency food assistance from WFP and approximately 520,000 benefiting from WFP-assisted rehabilitation and development activities.

7. During the last few months, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has supported a total of 73 supplementary feeding centres in central and southern Somalia, assisting a monthly average of 53,000 children and women, down from an average of over 95,000 at the height of the emergency. In May, however, the number of beneficiaries of supplementary feeding started rising again because of a considerable increase in the price of food products in some regions resulting from poor harvests combined with insecurity which prevented access to markets. UNICEF is also supporting nutrition programmes, including the distribution of vitamin A supplements, to a monthly average of 40,000 children.

8. A report published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WFP in mid-June forecasts food grain production of about 44,500 tonnes during the 1993/94 secondary rainy season, only one third of the corresponding output in the previous year, despite an increase of nearly 50 per cent in the area sown. Overall food grain production in 1993/94 is likely to be 60 per cent below the pre-civil war average. This serious setback, which is due to the failure of rains in the main growing areas, indicates a need for substantial cereal imports until the next main harvest in August. Food aid requirements for 1993/94 are estimated at approximately 343,000 tonnes. Pledges so far amount to 200,000 tonnes, leaving a shortfall of 143,000 tonnes.

Health

9. The containment of the cholera outbreak that started in early February 1994 has been largely a result of the coordinated efforts of the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Somali groups, with significant logistics support by UNOSOM II. A total of

24,650 cases had been identified and 872 fatalities reported by the end of June. WHO is now concentrating its efforts on the north-western part of the country where the epidemic has not yet abated, while UNICEF is pursuing chlorination of water sources to prevent any resurgence of the disease and trying to change people's attitudes to sanitation.

10. During the period under review, WHO expanded its support to tuberculosis treatment programmes in Mogadishu, Belet Hawa (Gedo) and the north-western part of Somalia. WHO is in the process of supplying anti-malaria drugs, laboratory equipment and supplies to Mogadishu and Hargeisa. WHO, UNICEF and Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres (PSF) have continued to operate jointly a system of procurement and distribution of essential drugs and of primary health-care guidelines.

11. Between September 1993 and July 1994, UNICEF pursued its objective of vaccinating 142,000 children against tuberculosis and another 164,000 against four other preventable diseases, as well as 102,000 women of child-bearing age against tetanus. Despite security constraints, outreach campaigns were completed in Mogadishu North, Kismayo and the Juba Valley, and Bossasso. UNICEF is currently providing various forms of support to 24 hospitals, 105 mother and child health centres, 50 out-patient departments and more than 200 health posts, in addition to providing training to community health workers and traditional birth attendants.

Water

12. Support by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the Mogadishu Water Supply System, which was started in June 1992 as an emergency assistance project, has been suspended as a result of recurring labour disputes resulting in threats against staff. In addition, emergency funding for this project is now exhausted and UNDP is seeking urgent contributions to allow for a continuation of supplies and services to the end of the year. Any interruption of this water supply scheme would expose up to 1 million Somalis to water-borne diseases and would make a resurgence of cholera more than likely. It would also aggravate the security situation and jeopardize stability in the Mogadishu region. Already, throughout the country, access to safe drinking water remains limited and many Somalis are forced to use contaminated water sources, leading to exposure to water-borne diseases, despite efforts by UNICEF, UNHCR, several NGOs and national military contingents to dig new protected wells, rehabilitate others and assist urban water projects.

Agriculture and fisheries

13. In preparation for the current agricultural season, FAO has distributed 300 tonnes of cereal seeds, 10 tonnes of vegetable seeds and 62,000 hand-tools in cooperation with other United Nations organizations, NGOs and national military contingents. Plant protection teams are surveying and spraying against common crop pests. In north-western Somalia, FAO has rehabilitated slaughter houses. FAO and UNDP will soon take part in a fishery development project to cover areas from Merka to Adale.

Education

14. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), with some support from UNICEF, UNHCR and NGOs, has set up two education development centres, one at Mogadishu and the other at Baidoa, which have been used since 1993 for curriculum development, the design and production of teaching materials and textbooks, and teacher-training programmes, as well as support for the establishment of a local educational authority in the absence of a proper Ministry of Education. Workshops organized for Somali teachers cover the whole country as well as refugee camps in Kenya. A Somalia Open Learning Unit (SOMOLU) was launched at the end of March 1994 and already provides in-service teacher training to 105 teachers in Mogadishu. Arrangements are being made to offer SOMOLU programmes also in Baidoa and Hargeisa. UNICEF has provided material support to some 400 primary schools throughout Somalia. New emphasis is being put on support to Koranic schools that have remained active throughout the disturbances of the past years.

Shelter and survival

15. UNDP and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) are cooperating in the formulation of a programme to support shelter reconstruction and low-cost housing in the north-eastern region of Nugal and to assist the municipality of Hargeisa in the rehabilitation of physical facilities as well as the restoration of the municipality's management capabilities.

Transport

16. UNDP, in cooperation with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and with complementary inputs by WFP, is providing management support to the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and UNDP are also providing support for the strengthening of national capacities to manage Mogadishu airport.

B. Settlement and repatriation

17. There are still nearly 500,000 Somalis living as refugees in neighbouring countries as well as an estimated 400,000 displaced within their own country, the majority of them (240,000) in Mogadishu.

18. UNOSOM II has continued to take an active part in the resettlement programme for the internally displaced, with support from the military component for overnight transit arrangements, medical screening, transport and escorts and from NGOs, WFP and UNICEF for the identification of beneficiaries, arrangements with the leaders of villages of origin and the provision of food and domestic assistance. During the period under review, a total of 15,000 internally displaced persons have been helped to return to their places of habitual residence.

19. The humanitarian programme in Somalia has lacked an organization with the necessary experience to address the pressing needs of the displaced. This has forced the UNOSOM II Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to

assume a direct operational role. In early June, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) undertook a 10-day assessment mission to Somalia to develop a comprehensive programme for the resettlement of the remaining internally displaced persons. I welcome the initiative of IOM and urge Governments to provide the financial support needed to resolve this problem rapidly. However, not all internally displaced persons will wish to return to their previous areas of residence. UNDP has accordingly initiated consultations with the International Labour Organization (ILO) with a view to formulating a programme of employment and income-generation for displaced persons, particularly in the Mogadishu area.

20. The Liboi refugee camp in Kenya was closed on 17 June, bringing to three the number of Somali refugee camps that have ceased operations in the last six-month period. Of the 42,000 Somalis registered in Liboi, 24,000 chose to return voluntarily to their country while the remainder were transferred to another camp in Kenya away from the border. UNHCR, together with UNICEF and NGOs based in Somalia, is monitoring this self-organized repatriation and is ready to intervene to alleviate problems that may arise. Other voluntary return movements by land and sea are being planned by UNHCR with a view to supporting the repatriation of 35,000 Somalis from Kenya, another 15,000 from Ethiopia and up to 5,000 expected to return from Yemen. UNHCR has been severely hampered in its repatriation and reintegration activities in Somalia by lack of funding and had to issue a special appeal on 1 July 1994.

C. From relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction

21. Following the transfer of the United Nations Development Office (UNDO) from UNOSOM II to UNDP with effect from 1 May 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between UNOSOM II and UNDP regarding UNOSOM II's continued cooperation with UNDO, including logistical support for the preparation of regional profiles and for technical or donor missions. In May, UNDO conducted a mission to Middle Shabelle to prepare a regional profile and, in late June, a technical mission was undertaken to the Nugal region. A multidonor mission to north-eastern Somalia is planned for July. It will be recalled that in paragraph 5 of resolution 897 (1994), the Security Council approved giving priority to directing international reconstruction resources to those regions where security was being re-established and to local Somali institutions which were prepared to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities.

22. The Somali Rehabilitation Programme funded by UNDP, with a budget of US$ 20 million, continues its activities through Project Implementation Offices in north-western, north-eastern and southern Somalia. Subprojects are currently active in such fields as school rehabilitation, improvement of wells and boreholes and establishment of water committees, road construction, small-scale enterprise promotion through cooperatives, agriculture, fisheries, frankincense production, credit schemes and marketing of produce.

23. As already mentioned, the gains achieved in combating one of the greatest humanitarian crises remain extremely tenuous. There is genuine concern among the humanitarian organizations that their capacity to pursue the priority tasks of protecting the vulnerable, encouraging the voluntary repatriation of the

refugees, resettling the internally displaced persons and promoting a transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction will be hampered by the rapidly diminishing resources available as well as by growing security problems.

III. SECURITY ISSUES

A. Security functions performed by UNOSOM II forces

24. In the implementation of its mandate, UNOSOM II endeavours to maintain security at key installations, escort relief convoys and protect personnel, particularly in emergencies and the precarious security situations resulting, especially, from banditry. With the training of more Somali police, UNOSOM II forces are increasingly undertaking joint operations with the police, which helps to ensure Somali participation in security activities.

B. Inter-clan fighting

25. The security situation, especially in Mogadishu, has been marred recently by clashes among clans and sub-clans. The most serious of these erupted on 24 June 1994 in south Mogadishu between the Habr Gedir and Hawadle sub-clans and threatened to spread throughout Mogadishu and its environs. The Acting Deputy Special Representative issued an appeal to the parties to cease hostilities. This was widely publicized by the local press and radio stations. He also discussed ways and means of ending the hostilities with Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, and other political and military leaders, all of whom said that they agreed on the need to stop the fighting. They also said that they were willing to continue to support UNOSOM II's efforts for a comprehensive agreement to end the hostilities. It is understood that Abgal, Habr Gedir and Mursade elders have been meeting in Mogadishu to find ways of defusing the tension and restoring peace.

26. During the hostilities, UNOSOM II instituted the following security measures: (a) all UNOSOM II strongpoints throughout Mogadishu were placed on maximum alert; (b) Somali militias were prohibited from deploying "technicals", especially around strongpoint No. 7; (c) the Quick Reaction Force was placed on standby; (d) UNOSOM II Cobra helicopters flew periodically over areas of inter-clan fighting to monitor the situation; (e) movement of UNOSOM II personnel and vehicles was restricted; (f) patrolling of UNOSOM II's main supply routes was intensified; and (g) all personnel within the Embassy and University compounds were required to wear flak jackets and helmets when they moved inside these areas.

27. In addition to the deterioration in the security situation emanating from inter-clan fighting, a UNOSOM II convoy was ambushed in Mogadishu on 18 July 1994. Two Malaysian soldiers were killed and four (three Malaysians and one Italian) were wounded. During the course of the attack, 11 soldiers, including the 4 wounded, were abducted and subsequently released.

C. Impact of the deterioration in security on the provision of humanitarian assistance

28. The recurring outbreaks of inter-clan fighting that have affected Mogadishu over the last three months have brought to an almost total standstill, for almost half the reporting period, all humanitarian activities in the capital city and its immediate vicinity. This instability has also resulted in a breakdown of already tenuous mechanisms to settle disputes (particularly those related to employment) between humanitarian agencies and the local community. The Save the Children Fund (UK) has had to suspend indefinitely its activities in Mogadishu, as has UNDP at the Mogadishu Water Supply Project. Access by commercial traffic to the port of Mogadishu was interrupted for two weeks and WFP operations there have been hampered by threats against staff and large-scale looting. Access roads to the port have often been blocked by armed militias. As a consequence, WFP was able to move only 10,000 tonnes of supplies out of the port during the second quarter of 1994, less than half the quantity programmed for the period. In many cases, United Nations agencies and NGOs are obliged to engage local security personnel to guard their property which involves the risk of a return to the lawless situation which characterized the earlier phase of the crisis in Somalia.

29. In outlying areas in the southern part of the country, the situation has been more stable, with the notable exceptions of Wajid, where an expatriate staff member of Medecins du Monde (Greece) lost his life in March, and parts of Lower Juba where several incidents took place, including the killing of a UNHCR staff member in April. It is hoped that the recent Lower Juba and Absame Reconciliation Agreements will improve security in that region. Most of the major security incidents outside Mogadishu have occurred in the southern part of Somalia where there is no permanent presence of UNOSOM II troops. Their presence in other locations has helped to reduce banditry and ensure the protection not only of expatriate staff but also of Somali personnel.

30. The uncertainties concerning the future size and deployment of troops have been a source of concern for the humanitarian community. The security of, and access to, seaports and airports, the protection of offices, residences and warehouses, the capacity to escort convoys and a rapid evacuation capability are considered by the United Nations agencies and NGOs operating in Somalia to be essential to their humanitarian work. As is evident from the present report, UNOSOM II is having increasing difficulty in providing these services in some parts of the country, notably in Mogadishu itself.

IV. FORCE STRUCTURE, CAPABILITIES AND MISCELLANEOUS TASKS

A. Strength and deployment

31. The current force strength, including logistics support elements, is 18,790 as at 10 July 1994. The Force is deployed as follows:

Contributing country	Unit	Location	Strength
Australia	Movement control unit	Mogadishu	55
Bangladesh	Battalion	Afgoi	940
Botswana	Battalion	Bardera	420
Egypt	Brigade	Mogadishu Port and Airport	1 665
India	Brigade	Baidoa/Kismayo	4 920
Ireland	Transportation unit	Baidoa	90
Malaysia	Battalion	Mogadishu	955
Nepal	Security unit	Mogadishu	310
Nigeria	Battalion	Merka	700
Pakistan	Brigade	Mogadishu	6 875
	Quick reaction force	Mogadishu	170
Romania	Hospital	Mogadishu	230
Zimbabwe	Battalion Signals company	Balad/Belet Weyne	900
Multinational	Force headquarters	Mogadishu	560
		Total	18 790

32. Outside Mogadishu, UNOSOM II forces are thinly stretched. Since March, there have been considerable troop reductions in the Balad/Belet Weyne area of responsibility. There is now only a company at Belet Weyne and a battalion at Balad, with no troops deployed between those two locations in the Middle Shabelle region of Jowhar/Jalalaxi. In substantial areas, regular patrols are the only contribution UNOSOM II can make to the maintenance of security. It is also becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the required range and number of escorts for humanitarian relief and logistical convoys. These difficulties will become more acute if the security situation deteriorates further.

B. Concept of operations

33. In the light of the revised mandate of UNOSOM II approved by the Security Council, its concept of operations focuses on consolidating activities in the current area of operations both inside Mogadishu and in outlying areas. The key elements of the concept are:

(a) To secure key facilities and installations, particularly airports, seaports and lines of communications;

(b) To maintain a continuous presence in key routes and within areas of responsibility through continuous patrolling;

(c) To assist in re-establishing the Somali police through direct assistance and conducting joint patrols;

(d) To provide security for humanitarian aid convoys.

C. Miscellaneous tasks

Air operations

34. A plan is in place to re-establish Somali national civil control over Somali national airspace. There is close liaison with ICAO and progress is being made. A trust fund agreement for the collection of air navigation charges for aircraft overflying Somali airspace is being finalized and a contract with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) for the collection of funds is being prepared. Comprehensive developments have been initiated at Mogadishu airport. An airfield management team consisting of UNOSOM II military personnel is responsible for the operation of the airfield. Although the air traffic control services are currently being provided by military personnel, local civilian controllers are being trained and sufficient numbers should be available by October 1994 to enable UNOSOM II to fill only supervisory posts.

Humanitarian support

35. Humanitarian assistance provided by UNOSOM II troops covers a broad spectrum of activity, ranging from providing security escorts for humanitarian convoys to conducting specialized courses for the Somali police. Numerous community development projects have been conducted and the provision of medical aid to Somali civilians has been a priority for all military contingents. Contingents in the fertile lower Shabelle River region have concentrated on assistance to local agriculture, whereas contingents in urban areas such as Mogadishu have been supporting the development of community and vocational training projects in those areas where security conditions permit. UNOSOM II forces have assisted also in activities related to food for work projects, improvement of water supplies, resettlement of displaced persons, medical assistance, reconstruction and the provision of animal husbandry and veterinary aid.

Support to Somali police

36. The gradual transfer of security functions from UNOSOM II to the re-established Somali police force is a primary objective of the police programme. UNOSOM II is achieving this through the provision of security for police activities at key police and court facilities and providing basic training which is not available through other programmes, as well as assisting in the delivery of police vehicles, weapons and equipment. Courses in drill, weapons training, vehicle driving/maintenance and hygiene and sanitation are now being conducted by military personnel for 520 Somali police.

V. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAMME

37. In the Declaration of the Leaders of the Somali Political Organizations, signed at Nairobi on 24 March 1994 (S/1994/614, annex I), the Somali political faction leaders explicitly expressed their support for the concept of voluntary disarmament. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 923 (1994), the Security Council strongly urged all parties in Somalia to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and to carry out the commitments and implement the agreements which they had signed, including those relating to voluntary disarmament. However, those commitments have not been honoured and it is evident that militias have been rearming and replenishing their weapons supplies. The number of "technicals" and vehicles with armed militia sighted near UNOSOM II compounds and strong points has increased in recent months. Somalis currently have no inclination to hand in their weapons voluntarily. Should they choose to do so, UNOSOM II is prepared to collect and safeguard all weapons handed in.

VI. DEMINING PROGRAMME

38. The demining programme has continued to expand since my last report and demining projects are wholly executed by Somali deminers. The number of demining groups has increased more than two-fold to 13 and 5 others will start shortly. There has been a similar increase in ordnance destroyed: anti-tank mines up by 60 per cent to 5,253, anti-personnel mines up two-fold to 2,223 and unexploded ordnance up two-fold to 20,150. In addition, 56 square kilometres of grazing land and 60 square kilometres of roads have been cleared of mines.

39. The environment in which demining can take place would be more secure if the reconciliation process was more successful. That would enable UNOSOM II to field more international staff to supervise and monitor demining activities.

VII. POLICE AND JUSTICE PROGRAMMES

40. The operations of the recently established Police Division, which was formerly part of the Justice Division, have as their main objective the re-establishment by the end of 1994 of a neutral and credible Somali police force with a strength of 10,000 personnel. At 8 July 1994, police recruits totalled 7,869. The Police Division has intensified its work related to the training of police personnel, the supply and use of equipment and other forms of

logistical support, as well as the repair or refurbishment of police stations. At 8 July 1994, 96 of the 125 police stations had become operational.

41. With respect to the programme related to training, the 50 civilian police officers (CIVPOLs) contributed by Member States have been deployed in those areas of the country where security conditions permit. These include Baidoa (Zimbabwe: five), Hargeisa (Netherlands: three and Republic of Korea: two), Mogadishu (Ghana: one; Ireland: one; Italy: one; and Malaysia: three) and Bardera (Ghana: four). Deployment of CIVPOLs in Galkayo, Kismayo and Merka will proceed when security conditions permit and when accommodation and training facilities become available. An additional group of five police advisers is deployed in Baidoa, Bossaaso, Galkayo and Mogadishu. More police advisers are expected to be deployed shortly in Afgoi, Balad, Bardera and Kismayo. The training team provided by the United States International Criminal Investigations Technical Assistance Program (ICITAP) was recently withdrawn temporarily from Somalia for security reasons.

42. One of the major obstacles to the implementation of the Somali police programme has been the lack of training facilities in the regions. The facilities that existed previously have either been destroyed, are in a bad state of repair or are occupied by squatters. With a view to meeting this shortage, especially in Mogadishu, ICITAP had assisted in the refurbishment of a training school within the United States Embassy compound at Mogadishu which can accommodate up to 100 trainees.

43. The Darawishta is a rapid deployment unit which will handle difficult situations in the regions involving banditry, robbery and other serious crimes. The current training of the Darawishta is expected to be completed by the end of September 1994. The trained personnel, expected to number approximately 2,000, will thereafter be assigned to the regions. The military aspect of the Darawishta training is very important if the unit is to operate effectively against crime in the regions.

44. The Justice Division is continuing with the consolidation of its work programmes in the judicial, correctional, juvenile justice, crime prevention and human rights fields. Work relating to the repair and refurbishment of 54 court houses in 28 districts is progressing, and plans for the refurbishment of an additional 38 district court houses, 8 regional court houses and 8 court houses for the Courts of Appeals are being prepared. The missions undertaken in May and June by Justice Division personnel identified 146 judges for the courts which are being re-established in Bari, Nugal, Mudug, Lower Juba, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran and Lower Shabelle regions.

45. In the correctional work programme, rehabilitation of 14 prisons in 9 regions is nearing completion. The Justice Division is liaising with the district/regional councils concerned on appointment of custodial guards for the additional prisons which are being refurbished. Training programmes for the custodial staff are scheduled to commence in July.

46. In the juvenile justice work programme, the Somali Law on the Juvenile Court and Reformatories has been translated into Italian and Somali and brief commentaries thereon are being compiled. In the correctional facilities

re-established in Somalia, attention is being paid to the specific needs of juveniles, in order to ensure compliance with the relevant international standards and norms. The Street Children Redemption Educational and Recreation Pilot Project will commence as soon as security conditions in Mogadishu permit.

47. In its human rights programme, the Division is seeking to expand its work beyond monitoring the rights of detainees and prisoners, the rights of accused persons and the performance of the police, the courts and the prison authorities. The programme will also address such issues as the rights of women and children in Somalia. Educational courses in human rights, particularly through seminars, are now being arranged. The Justice Division has now begun the deployment of its officers to the regions, in order to provide assistance to the criminal justice institutions which are being re-established. Considerable assistance is being obtained from the United Nations Volunteers.

VIII. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

48. My report of 24 May 1994 (S/1994/614, paras. 6 and 7) noted that, in the Declaration signed at Nairobi on 24 March 1994 (see para. 37 above), the Somali leaders decided to convene a National Reconciliation Conference on 15 May 1994, to elect a President and Vice-Presidents and to appoint a Prime Minister, and agreed that a Preparatory Meeting for the Conference should be convened on 15 April 1994. Both meetings were subsequently postponed owing to developments outlined in that report. These repeated delays were explained as being necessary in order to accommodate the participation of one faction from the north-west with a view to maintaining the territorial integrity of Somalia and to allow time for another faction in the north-east to resolve its leadership dispute. They nevertheless caused me considerable concern and raised grave doubts about the seriousness of the Somali leaders' commitment to national reconciliation.

49. No progress in this regard has been achieved since my report of 24 May. The Acting Special Representative has undertaken intensive consultations with the two signatories to the Nairobi Declaration, namely Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed, on behalf of the Group of 12, and General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aidid, on behalf of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and its allied factions, and has tried tirelessly to secure their agreement on a new date and venue for the Preparatory Meeting. The Group of 12, however, expressed concern about the prevailing security situation in Mogadishu and asked that the Meeting be convened in Nairobi instead. No agreement has so far been reached on either the date or venue. The date is now predicated on the conclusion of a number of regional and clan meetings and consultations that are claimed to be a crucial prelude to national reconciliation. These include the Lower Juba Regional Reconciliation Conference (held at Kismayo from 24 May to 19 June 1994); the Absame Reconciliation Conference (held at Dobley from 26 June to 9 July 1994); and the Congress of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which is expected to be convened shortly with a view to resolving the dispute within the leadership of that party. The timetable agreed in March has already slipped by over three months and there is no clear indication of when the Preparatory Meeting, let alone the Conference itself, will take place.

50. The Lower Juba conference resulted in the signing by representatives of the 19 clans and sub-clans in that region of an agreement on 19 June 1994 which called for a general cease-fire to take effect in the region from 24 June 1994, the opening of all roads, campaigns of public awareness, the restoration of property to its rightful owners, the safety of the personnel and property of United Nations agencies and NGOs and the establishment of a system of administration for the region, as well as judicial organs and a prison system. Four committees were set up to oversee the implementation of the Agreement. On 19 June 1994, General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" and Mr. Osman Atto, on behalf of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and SNA respectively, signed a statement pledging the support of their factions for implementation of the agreement. This was particularly significant because the conference had left it to the faction leaders to finalize arrangements relating to the cantonment and rehabilitation of militia members. The statement endorsed the conference's decision to make Kismayo a weapon-free zone.

51. The Lower Juba conference left the door open for the Absame sub-clans who were absent from the conference to join in the implementation of the agreement after the conclusion of their own intra-clan negotiations in Dobley. The Conference, attended by 500 delegates representing 11 Absame sub-clans, opened on 26 June 1994 in an atmosphere of celebration as the delegates welcomed a large number of refugees who had returned from Kenya in anticipation of the peace and stability they expected to result from the Lower Juba and the Absame conferences.

52. The Absame conference concluded on 9 July 1994 with the reading of an Absame Accord which, inter alia, set up mechanisms for the re-unification of the SPM and SPM (SNA) and for the peaceful settlement of property disputes, and called for reconciliation between the Absame and other Somali communities, security for humanitarian agencies operating in Absame-controlled areas, and the establishment of courts, a prison system and a police force. In addressing the closing ceremony of the conference, my Special Representative underscored the need for the Absame community to enter into dialogue with other communities and to arrive at accommodative arrangements with the signatories to the Lower Juba peace agreement as part of the process of national reconciliation.

53. UNOSOM II has continued to assist in the setting up of district councils. Two additional district councils have been established in Las Koreh and Dahar in the Sanaag region since the signing of the Nairobi Declaration in March. This was the first time that people from a region located in "Somaliland" had invited UNOSOM II to assist them in establishing their local administrative structures. The number of district councils established to date now stands at 57 (out of a total of 92). 1/ The number of regional councils remains at 8 out of a total of 18.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

54. The present report has described UNOSOM II's continued efforts to improve the overall situation in Somalia, which is now significantly better than when UNOSOM was first deployed but worse than at the time of my last report on 24 May 1994. In many regions daily life is returning to normal and agricultural

production is recovering. Progress is being achieved in the rebuilding of institutions, especially the police and the judicial system. These achievements are grounds for hope that the Somali people can resume normal lives after the hardship that they have suffered over the last several years. On the other hand, there has been a significant deterioration in the security situation, especially in Mogadishu, due both to a resumption of inter-clan fighting and to a further increase in banditry; and the national reconciliation process is advancing at a pace so slow that there is little or no reason to believe that the target of completing the process by March 1995 can be achieved.

55. Responsibility for this state of affairs rests squarely with the Somali leaders. Such progress as has been achieved cannot be consolidated, or further progress made, until the many factions in Somalia, and especially their leaders, decide to work seriously together to reach a durable political settlement that can ensure stability in their country. In this respect, the repeated postponement of the National Reconciliation Conference and its Preparatory Meeting raises serious concern and disappointment among those who have done so much to help Somalia. Regional conferences such as that in Lower Juba can help to reduce insecurity and can contribute to national reconciliation but their achievements will be of little significance if the current tendency for a further fragmentation of factions is not reversed.

56. In these circumstances, the international community's growing concern about how long it will be expected to support efforts towards national reconciliation in Somalia is fully understandable. The repeated postponements of conferences, the emergence of new subgroups and the lack of a clear reconciliation process have created the impression that talks between Somali leaders at various levels could continue indefinitely. The impression is also created that, despite the prolonged suffering of the Somali people, certain Somali leaders are still not prepared to subordinate their personal ambitions for power to the cause of peace and stability in Somalia.

57. I would accordingly like, once again, to stress to the Somali leaders that the international community has dedicated substantial resources and shown great patience in the hope that it can help to re-establish Somalia as a society that is both peaceful and self-reliant. But this commitment cannot continue indefinitely in a world where there are so many situations of conflict and human suffering that call for the international community's attention. It is essential that Somali political leaders redouble their efforts to reach agreement on a basis of pluralism and mutual tolerance so that the international community can regain confidence that it will be able to complete its mission in Somalia by March 1995.

58. Meanwhile, I have asked my new Special Representative to prepare an in-depth assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia. I have also decided to undertake a comprehensive review of the current troop strength of UNOSOM II. It is not clear to me that the present situation in Somalia permits the force to make a sufficiently effective contribution to the maintenance of security to justify its present size and cost. More than half of the force is currently located in Mogadishu but, through no fault of its own, it has been able to do little to mitigate the security consequences of major outbreaks of inter-clan fighting there. UNOSOM II's success in this area has

been achieved by diplomatic rather than military means. I am inclined therefore to think that it may be feasible to commence a reduction in the level of troops at present assigned to UNOSOM II. I accordingly intend to dispatch shortly a special mission from Headquarters to discuss the extent of such reduction with my Special Representative and the Force Commander and to present specific recommendations to me. The Mission will, of course, pay special attention to the views of the humanitarian agencies and NGOs. The essential tasks of ensuring the security of UNOSOM II personnel and humanitarian assistance programmes and personnel will remain a high priority in any reconfiguration of the military component of UNOSOM II, especially in the light of the recent ambush of UNOSOM II forces referred to in paragraph 27 above.

59. It is also, of course, essential that sufficient resources are made available to make it possible for the humanitarian agencies and NGOs to maintain their efforts. I urge the international community to increase its financial support for their programmes in the coming months.

60. I have continued to exchange views on the situation in Somalia with the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) with a view to furthering our cooperation in the search for lasting peace in that country. I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation to the three organizations for their cooperation with and support for the United Nations efforts in Somalia.

61. In conclusion, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Mr. Lansana Kouyate who, as Acting Special Representative, has demonstrated exceptional devotion and skill in his efforts to move Somali leaders towards compromise. I have every confidence that his successor, Mr. James Victor Gbeho, who assumes his responsibilities at a critical stage, will use his long experience to facilitate the negotiation of a durable political settlement in Somalia. I also would like to express my deep appreciation to the Force Commander, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar, to all civilian and military personnel in UNOSOM II, United Nations agencies and NGOs, as well as to their Somali colleagues, for the courage and commitment they continue to demonstrate in fulfilling their tasks in this complex and hazardous mission. Lastly, I wish to pay tribute to those individuals of UNOSOM II and humanitarian agencies and NGOs who made the ultimate sacrifice in their efforts to ease human suffering and restore peace to Somalia.

Notes

1/ The legal status of several districts is still the subject of discussions between UNOSOM II and local Somali communities. As a result, the total number of districts described as existing in Somalia may vary.

UNITED
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 18 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement adopted by the Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on the latest situation in Banja Luka in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I would appreciate if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of Pakistan to the United Nations and
Chairman of the OIC Contact Group on
Bosnia and Herzegovina in New York

ANNEX

Statement on the situation in Banja Luka, adopted by the Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 13 July 1994

The Contact Group of the member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina held a meeting in New York on 13 July 1994 to consider the continuous and systematic practice of ethnic cleansing perpetrated, and in recent months intensified, in the Serb-held territories in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular in the Banja Luka region.

They strongly condemn the continuing hostilities by the Bosnian Serbs, in particular the abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing and the variety of tactics employed towards this end, including murder, rape, fire-bombings and demolition of houses, arbitrary imprisonment usually accompanied by beatings and/or torture, physical intimidation and harassment, dismissal from jobs, etc., all of which have been thoroughly documented by numerous United Nations and other independent international human rights bodies and organizations.

They emphasize that this persistent and systematic practice of ethnic cleansing by de facto Serb authorities and forces in Banja Luka and other areas constitutes a clear violation of the agreement of 8 June 1994 on the cessation of hostilities, as well as relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the Geneva Conventions, and it also seriously jeopardizes the ongoing peace effort.

Such acts are also inconsistent with the proposed peace settlement, whereby the right of refugees to return freely to their homes is proclaimed. Any peace plan can neither condone nor acquiesce in the appalling practice of ethnic cleansing.

They demand that the Serb authorities immediately put an end to these despicable acts, some of which constitute a form of genocide.

The members of the Contact Group call for the immediate deployment of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops and United Nations monitors to the region in order to deter further attacks on civilians and human rights abuses against the non-Serb population in Banja Luka and other Serb-held areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1994/841
19 July 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the violations of the cease-fire provisions and of the terms governing the area of separation between Iraq and Iran that were committed by the Iranian side between 26 April and 30 June 1994.

26-29 April 1994

In the Shatt al-Arab, close to the mouth of the Karun River, an Iranian patrol boat with 10 armed persons on board tried to prevent the Iraqi research vessel Ulum from putting to sea.

The Iranian side proceeded to build a border complex in the Iranian Khusrawi area at coordinates 435050 (1:100,000 map of Khanaqin), inside the area of separation.

23-26 May 1994

An Iranian patrol boat intercepted the Russian ship Khimik Zelinsky and the tugboat Birkun, flying the Ukrainian flag and owned by the Black Sea Company, which was towing the ship. They were detained at 0700 hours on 23 May 1994 near buoy 12 while leaving the Shatt al-Arab and were only permitted to leave at 1200 hours on 26 May.

2 June 1994

At 1030 hours, an Iranian patrol boat with three military personnel on board, one of them carrying field glasses, was seen coming from Abadan harbour in the direction of the sea.

At 1330 hours, the Iranian side, using a hoist, erected six columns near the first Iranian control post. The corrugated iron sheets for the shed to be built were seen at the border complex in the Iranian Khusrawi area at coordinates 435050 (1:100,000 map of Khanaqin), inside the area of separation.

3 June 1994

At 1000 hours, an Iranian patrol boat with three military personnel on board was seen coming from Muhammarah harbour in the direction of Abadan harbour.

4 June 1994

At 0600 hours, an Iranian patrol boat with three military personnel on board was seen coming from Abadan harbour in the direction of the sea. At 0900 hours, it returned to its point of departure.

4 June 1994

The Iranian side established a new monitoring post at coordinates 311331 (1:100,000 map of Saybah), inside the area of separation.

9 June 1994

An Iranian patrol boat with three military personnel on board was seen coming from Muhammarah harbour in the direction of Abadan harbour. At 1215 hours, it returned to its point of departure.

9 June 1994

At 1830 hours, a khaki-coloured helicopter was seen flying over the Iranian Kani Sakht post at coordinates 999818 (1:100,000 map of Zurbatiyah), inside the area of separation. It then flew towards the Darraji post. At 1840 hours, it landed in the city of Mehran.

10 June 1994

At 1030 hours, an Iranian patrol boat with four military personnel on board was seen coming from Abadan harbour in the direction of Muhammarah harbour.

16 June 1994

At 1000 hours, two Iranian fighter aircraft flying at an altitude of 50 metres penetrated Iraqi airspace to a distance of 3-4 kilometres, 50 kilometres to the north-east of the Ali al-Sharqi area in Maysan Governorate.

19 June 1994

At 0930 hours, three khaki-coloured Iranian helicopters were seen flying from north to south parallel to the boundary line 2 kilometres inside Iranian territory. When they arrived opposite Mimak mountain at coordinates 008621 (1:100,000 map of Mandali), inside the area of separation, they returned to the Iranian rear.

20 June 1994

At 1000 hours, a khaki-coloured helicopter was seen coming from the Iranian rear towards the Iranian mound at coordinates 282487 (1:100,000 map of Sayf Sa'd), inside the area of separation. After a 5-minute flight, it returned to the Iranian rear.

24 June 1994

At 0200 hours, the Iranian side sent a group of some 30 of its personnel in three pick-up trucks to intercept the Iraqi forces at coordinates 003228 (1:100,000 map of Shaykh Sa'd) in the Shihabi area inside the area of separation, using launchers, 60-millimetre mortars and light-medium weapons. The clash lasted for 30 minutes and resulted in a number of persons being wounded and some military equipment and vehicles being destroyed.

25 June 1994

At 1300 hours, two Iranian officers, a major (the commander of the Khusrawi post) and a lieutenant, accompanied by three civilians came to the Iraqi wing of the Mundhiriyah border complex at coordinates 004104 (1:100,000 map of Khanaqin), informed the guards there that no Iraqis or Iraqi vehicles were to cross to the Iranian side and demanded the removal of the Iraqi flag and the portrait of the President of Iraq at the boundary line at coordinates 442057 (1:100,000 map of Khanaqin) because they were, they claimed, inside Iranian territory. When the guards on the Iraqi side stated that, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, Iranian persons and vehicles would be prevented from crossing, the Iranian officer replied that any Iraqi soldier preventing them would be killed by him and that he was speaking on behalf of his country. At 1900 hours, a number of Iraqi officers met with Iranian officers, one of them of senior rank, in the said Iraqi wing, when the Iranian officers repeated the same provocative demands and made unwarranted threats.

26 June 1994

At 1000 hours, four Iranian soldiers were seen near the Iranian Zarkush post building a sandbagged firing position at coordinates 082669 (1:100,000 map of Zurbatiyah), inside the area of separation. A single-barrel machine-gun and an Iranian flag were installed there, and at 1630 hours work was suspended.

29 June 1994

At 0930 hours, the Iranian side was seen building a new position manned by five to seven persons on hill 296 at coordinates 004701 (1:100,000 map of Kani Bazz), inside the area of separation.

30 June 1994

Recently, Iranian patrol boats have repeatedly been observed approaching to within 5 metres of the Iraqi shore of the Shatt al-Arab. Some of them have been intercepting the boats of Iraqi fishermen, questioning them, driving them away and informing them that they are not to come there again.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/842
19 July 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraqi national airspace committed by United States aircraft in order to carry out reconnaissance and cause provocation continued over the period 1 to 9 July 1994.

1 July 1994

(a) Northern region: 17 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Salman, Busayyah and Jalibah.

2 July 1994

Southern region: 49 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Basra, Samawah, Qurnah, Ushbayjah and Busayyah.

At 1345 hours on 2 July 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace over Nasiriyah, Shatrah, the area to the south of Diwaniyah and Amarah. It left at 1537 hours in the direction of Saudi Arabia.

3 July 1994

Southern region: 36 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Jalibah, Salman, Ushbayjah, Artawi and Shanafiyah.

5 July 1994

(a) Northern region: 19 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Shaqlawah and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 39 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Artawi, Jalibah and Busayyah.

At 1255 hours on 5 July 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace. It left at 1537 hours in the direction of Saudi Arabia.

6 July 1994

Southern region: 30 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Samawah, Chabaish, Busayyah, Jalibah, Artawi, Ushbayjah, Lasaf and Salman.

7 July 1994

(a) Northern region: 25 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Artawi, Salman, Jalibah and Busayyah.

8 July 1994

(a) Northern region: 21 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Ayn Zalah and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 38 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, the area to the south of Diwaniyah, Shatrah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah and Salman.

9 July 1994

(a) Northern region: 17 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 58 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah, Artawi, Ushbayjah and Khidr.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1994/843
19 July 1994
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LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

With reference to the letter from the Iranian Permanent Representative to the United Nations contained in document S/1994/719 of 17 June 1994, which alleges that a number of elements hostile to the Iranian regime crossed into Iranian territory in the area of Ein-Ghazal on 4 June 1994, killed two Iranian soldiers and captured a sergeant and three other soldiers, I wish to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Iraq formally denies these allegations.

By means of these allegations, Iran is seeking to divert attention from its repeated incursions and arbitrary practices against Iraqi vessels in the Shatt al-Arab, including the seizure of Iraqi fishing-boats and the killing of innocent fishermen. Iran is also constantly violating the provisions of the cease-fire agreement between the two countries along the length of the border, committing repeated breaches of the Tehran agreement concerning a separation zone and conducting armed military patrols in the Shatt al-Arab in defiance of this agreement.

In communicating this official denial to you, I wish to refer to my letter No. 1/6/134 of 1 July 1994. This letter mentioned the danger posed by the recent increase in Iranian violations, thus refuting Iran's groundless assertions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-29521 (E) 200794 200794

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/844
19 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 JULY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Parliament of the Bosniac-Croat Federation voted to accept the peace plan proposed by the Western Contact Group at their respective sessions held on 18 July 1994.

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina expects the Western Contact Group to take the necessary measures to encourage appropriate Karadzic's Serbs to accept the plan without preconditions or changes.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan Z. MISIĆ
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

94-29509 (E) 190794 19/07/94

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/845
19 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In view of the unprecedented gravity of the situation which the United Nations is facing with regard to the cash accounts of its peace-keeping operations, I am writing to draw the attention of the Security Council to a series of emergency measures which I have felt impelled to take with immediate effect.

I am also writing to appeal to those Member State which have not done so, to pay their outstanding contributions promptly and in full.

Yesterday, the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management brought this situation to the attention of the General Assembly, as the body responsible for approving the budgets of peace-keeping operations and the apportionment of their costs among Member States. He also appealed to Member States with outstanding contributions to make every effort to expedite payment.

In view of the responsibility of the Security Council for matters pertaining to international peace and security, I have concluded that the Council also should be advised of the seriousness of the situation, and that the Council should be asked to lend its support to the necessary actions.

As of last week, several major missions, including the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), were left with no funds in their accounts. Other missions in an equally precarious situation are: the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM); and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

A minimum of $200 million is needed each month to sustain the various peace-keeping operations, without allowing for reimbursements to troop-contributing countries. An additional $100 million a month is required to effect such reimbursements. At present, the Organization does not have these funds.

As of 30 June 1994, unpaid assessments for peace-keeping operations mandated by the Security Council exceeded $2,100 million. A number of contributions expected from Member States in June were not received. Unless,

therefore, substantial contributions are received immediately, no cash will be available to finance peace-keeping operations by the end of July or early August.

The Peace-keeping Reserve Fund and the funds available from the two completed operations, the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), are quite inadequate for these purposes.

I have therefore come to the conclusion that, as an interim measure, it will be necessary to borrow from some ongoing peace-keeping operations, which have very limited resources themselves, to meet the immediate requirements of other operations.

I have also decided to take urgent steps to reduce or delay expenditure in the peace-keeping operations as follows:

(a) All peace-keeping missions are being instructed to reduce or delay expenditures to the maximum extent possible;

(b) All but the most urgent procurement is being postponed;

(c) Recruitment is being postponed in all but the most essential cases.

Every effort has been made in the last few months to accelerate reimbursement of troop costs. However, in view of the gravity of the current financial situation, I have no alternative but to ask Governments of troop-contributing countries to show forbearance.

I should like to express my sincere appreciation to those Member States which have responded promptly to the assessment letters they have received. Unfortunately, however, such States constitute a very small minority of the membership of the Organization.

Substantial payments are needed urgently if operations are not to face financial collapse. I therefore appeal to Member States, particularly those with large outstanding contributions and those with special responsibilities for peace and security, to make every effort to expedite their payments and to do so soon.

All Member States have a collective responsibility to support financially the operations which they have mandated. Member States must honour their commitments now, if the Organization is to fulfil the tasks assigned to it.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/846
19 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 JULY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 7 July 1994 (S/1994/845), concerning the grave situation which the United Nations is facing with regard to cash accounts of its peace-keeping operations, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council

94-29494 (E) 190794 190794

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/847
19 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 JULY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 July 1994 (S/1994/829), concerning your decision, in consultation with the Acting Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), to have the staff of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) evacuated from Haiti, for security considerations, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council